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L. C. Green* International Law and the
Control of Terrorism
Any discussion of terrorism whether it affects the inlterests of a single
country or those of more than one immediately involves problems of
definition. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, for exam-
ple, terrorism is defined as "1. Government by intimidation as
directed and carried out by the party in power in France during the
Revolution of 1789-1794; the system of the 'Terror'; 2. A policy
intended to strike with terror those against whom it is adopted; the
employment of methods of intimidation; the fact of terrorizing or
condition of being terrorized." The English statute passed in connec-
tion with the 'troubles' in Ireland - Northern Ireland (Emergency
Provisions) Act, 1978' - is only slightly more helpful, for it defines
terrorism as "the use of violence for political ends and includes any
use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of
the public in fear."
The primary Dictionary definition reflects the political atmos-
phere of the time of its compilation and the views of those living in a
democratic state, for in the nineteenth century the principal concern
of libertarians was condemnation of authoritarian regimes and their
denial of human dignity. As concerns terrorist acts by individuals
acting on their own or on behalf of some political movement, the
general tendency was to regard those who were seelcing to overthrow
autocratic regimes as political heroes, and those whose targets were
friendly or non-authoritarian governments as anarchists. The second
Dictionary definition is wide enough to cover not only intimidation
and terror perpetrated by governments, but also by individual
offenders. In this it is similar to the English definition. If this is
considered in the fight of the Northern Ireland situation, it is of
limited and specific application. But if taken instead as a general
definition, it does not necessarily include government actions,
although a terrorist act committed on behalf of a foreign government
within England would fall within it. But primarily the definition
would apply to acts of individuals, (perhaps even including the
* L. C. Green, LL.B., LL.D., F.R.S.C., University Professor, University of Alberta.
1. 1978, c. 5, s. 3 1; see also, Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976, c.
8, s. 14(1).
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private kidnapper,) or of groups seeking to achieve some end of their
own, be it monetary, ideological or political. The trouble with this
type of definition is that if it is tied to 'political ends', as is the English
statute, efforts are rarely made to define what is meant by this, nor is
any attempt usually made to distinguish between the truly politically
motivated act and the 'crank' seeking international recognition, or
the private assassin asserting that his activities are directed to political
ends. In fact, a definition of this kind is perhaps wide enough to cover
individual threats or single acts of kidnapping by a self deluded
'Lenin'.
If one looks at the problem of state-directed terror, whether it be of
the kind that is perpetrated by military regimes in, for example,
South America, or whether it is the 'knock-in-the-night' type of
Stalin's Russia or Nazi Germany, it soon becomes clear that this does
not arouse the feelings of the public or the media nearly to the same
extent as does the isolated act of a private group. And when the
public is aroused by such acts of state terrorism, it tends to sympa-
thise with any rebel movement seeking to overthrow such a tyranny,
provided that the political temper of the rebel movement is not
anathema to the public concerned. If, on the other hand, the media or
government propaganda depict the rebels as nothing but murderers
restrained by a government seeking to maintain order and to intro-
duce, so it is asserted, a democratic regime when practical, then the
sympathies of the masses not involved in the actual dispute tend to
shift. The attitude of governments to such official acts of terror is that
the remedy lies through pressure arising from international commit-
ments in the field of human rights, even though the levels of coercion
or enforcement in this area are, for the most part, non-existent, or lie
solely in the form of verbal condemnation. Moreover, those states
which sympathise with the government involved will describe its
'friend' as upholding 'our' interests, while the rebels will be described
as 'terrorists' lumped together with the most obscene of terrorist
groups and condemned as tools and surrogates of, for example, 'the
Soviet threat to democracy'. The foreign policy of the Reagan admin-
istration best exemplifies this latter situation.
In view of this attitude to state terrorism, it is perhaps not surpris-
ing that the media and other manifestations of public opinion
emphasise individual terrorist activities, particularly as the acts of
governments are directed against their own nationals within their
own territory which do not affect the immediate interests of aliens.
Moreover, even democratic governments tend to play down criticism
of the acts of foreign authorities 2since they are concerned not to open
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the way for any foreign government to criticise their actions. The acts
of individual terrorists are frequently directed against foreign nation-
als or take place in foreign territory, which would automatically
receive international press coverage. At the same time, in view of the
vastxincrease that has takent place in intemat'on-al fa'Nl, the ohebrt
readily sees himself among the potential victims. Again, it must be
borne in mind that it is rare for states to be unquestionably proven to
have inspired or to have taken part in acts of terrorism outside their
own territory, although there was strong evidence that this was in fact
the case when Alexander of Yugoslavia and Barthou, the French
Foreign Minister, were murdered by Croatian terrorists/patriots at
Marseilles in 1934, allegedly with the support of the Hungarian
Government. 3 More recently, a number of governments, including
that of the United Kingdom, have alleged that Libyan refugees in
their countries have been murdered by Libyan terrorists on the
instructions and with the active support of the Local. Libyat antbas-
sador. This view finds some support in statements made by President
Gaddafi calling for the extermination of enemies of his regime
wherever they may be.
4
The activities of terrorists express themselves in a variety of ways,
including the despatch of explosive materials through the mails,
destruction of public buildings, attacks against cultural institutions,
kidnapping of government and business officials, assassination of
eminent persons, the seizure of schools with their children, hijackings
of the means of transport (particularly aircraft), attacks against
industrial establishments, violence against diplomats and embassies,
and so on. To attempt to provide a comprehensive list is self-defeating.
On the other hand technology is as readily available to terrorists as it
is to those seeking to frustrate their activities; second, any list tends to
be regarded as exhaustive, leading to assertions that if a particular act
has not been condemned as terrorist it cannot be regarded as such. As
a result, when attempts are made to condemn terrorist acts and to
designate them criminal by way of an international instrument, the
general practice nowadays is to abandon the search for a comprehen-
2. Perhaps the worst example of this was the pre-1939 attitude ofthe British government
towards Nazi atrocities in Germany, which were not officially exposed or condemned
until after the outbreak of war, Germany No. 2 (1939),"Papers concerning the Treatment
of German Nafionalsin Germany, 193%-37, Cmd. 612D (1939).
3. See, e.g., League of Nations Council debate, Nov./Dec. 1934, 1 Friedlander, Terror-
ism - Documents of International and Local Control, (1979), at 217; Toynbee, Survey of
International Affairs 1934, (1935), at 566-573.
4. The 77mes (London), 13, 14 Jun. 17 Sept. 1980; for similar problems affecting the
Federal Republic of Germany, Id., 16 Sept. 1980.
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sive treaty condemning terrorism as such. Instead, the tendency is to
seek out a particular type of terrorism, such as acts of violence against
aircraft or diplomats or the taking of hostages, and draft a text
regarding this type of activity in the hope that it will be generally
acceptable to governments. Such a project is perhaps more realistic
than a comprehensive treaty, and it leaves the way open for action
which may be stimulated when some particular act of terrorism
arouses general condemnation.
While it may be difficult to define terrorism or to prepare a
comprehensive list of all such acts, it is probably true to say that the
public at large can 'smell' terrorism when it occurs. The trouble is,
however, that one man's terrorist is another man's patriot.5 Also, not
every one is terrorized by the same action. The very idea of terroriza-
tion depends on subjective reaction and, as a result, we find that the
definitions of terrorism reflect the fears of whoever puts them for-
ward. For example, in time of war, belligerents frequently resort to
means of fighting which terrorize those against whom they are
directed. And this is even true of organized offensive acts normally
regarded as legitimate, even though they might strictly be contrary to
the rules of the law of armed conflict. Thus the victims of city
bombing are in fact terrorized, but such action does not fall within
the concept of terrorism as it is understood today. This means that
many of the acts that take place between belligerents which are
described as acts of terrorism, as was, for instance, the taking of
hostages during the Second World War, should be more correctly
treated as war crimes. 6 This is true even of acts which are intended to
terrorize a military uift or a civil population. Thus, an attack by an
armed force or by infiltrators engaged in an armed conflict -even if it
be one that does not strictly amount to war in the normally recog-
nized sense of that word - such as an armed attack against a village,
hospital or school, while it may be regarded by the persons against
whom it is directed or the government whose policy it is intended to
affect as an act of terrorism, should nevertheless be distinguished
from such acts and treated, depending on the circumstances, either as
an offence against the local criminal law or the law of war. Such acts
are perhaps more frequently committed during a non-international
5. See, e.g., Harrington, Epigrams of Treason, (1618), "Treason doth never prosper,
what's the reason? Why, if it prosper, none dare call it treason"; see also, Montesquieu,
Persian Letters, (1721), tr. Healy, (1964), at 174.
6. See, e.g., U.S. v. List (The Hostages Case) (1948) U.N. War Crimes Commission, 8
Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 34, 76; see also, Schwarzenberger, 2 Interna-
tional Law, The Law of Armed Conflict, (1968), ch. 17.
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than an international conflict, as for example during a civil war or
during such phenomena as that in Northern Ireland. It is true that
many of the acts of violence committed in that territory are intended
to terrorize the population or part thereof, orto bring pressure upon
tt uhriies i osdty to, stye,~ somt ssion vy oty. 1{'Rvt.r,
since acts of this lind do not normally affect the interests of any
country other than that directly involved, they do not constitute acts
with which international law is concerned, but remain to be dealt
with under the local criminal law. The fact that the government, the
people or the law in question may describe such acts as terrorism does
not make them so in the eyes of international law, When, however,
the violence escapes from, for example, Northern Ireland, so that the
interests of some state other than Ireland or the United Kingdom
becomes affected, the situation changes. Thus, if a Pritish diplomatic
representative abroad is attacked by some Irish activist, or a British
military base in Germany is bombed, then international law becomes
concerned, for the peace and security of a non-involved state has
been brought into issue.
A somewhat similar situation prevails in regard to armed conflict.
While the acts of violence or terror remain geographically confined to
the area of hostilities and are not intentionally directed against
nationals of states not participating in such hostilities, third states are
not involved, other than seeking to restore peace or preserve some
semblance of humanity in so far as the treatment of non-combatants
may be concerned. However, even though one of the parties to such a
conflict condemns the acts as terrorist, and while there may be no
actual war being fought between, for example, the State of Israel and
its Arab opponents (whether such opponents be neighbouring states
or elements of some Palestinian 'Liberation' Movement), provided
that the activities in question remain within the territories of the
parties involved in that conflict and are directed against the nationals
of those parties, the situation does not amount to terrorism as that
word is now technically employed. The fact that public opinion or
Israeli law may apply such terms to acts of this kind does not alter the
situation. The acts become terrorist from the point of view of interna-
tional interest when the rights of a non-partisan are affected. Thus,
acts of violence committed against civilians by Palestinian or Israeli
activists in Israel or some Arab territory should, even though they are
intended to terrorize the population or government affected, and
even though the rest of the world condemns them as terrorist,
nevertheless be treated as crimes according to the law of the country
in which committed or as war crimes. They are not terrorist as
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understood by international law. The latter becomes concerned
when, for example, the operations take place outside the affected
territories or are directed against, perhaps, a foreign embassy within
those territories in the hope that the country of the latter may be
induced to change its policy vis-h-vis the Middle East hostilities, orbe
persuaded to apply pressure to the belligerents for some concession.
Equally, if an Israeli embassy in Bangkok is attacked, or an Arab
agent in Paris or Oslo is murdered, the situation changes. The
involvement of Thailand, or France or Norway as a victim changes
the nature of the act committed from that of, at most, a war crime, to
one of international terrorism.
Perhaps the clearest instance of this distinction between national
or internal and international terrorism is to be found in the Quebec
crisis of October 1970. A separatist political cell kidnapped a member
of the Quebec government with the aim of applying pressure to both
the provincial and federal governments. Another separatist group
kidnapped the British Trade Commissioner with the same purpose,
anticipating that the desire to keep British friendship would persuade
the Canadian authorities to compromise to secure the diplomat's
freedom, or in the hope that Britain would apply pressure to the
Canadian government to effect some compromise to this end. In fact,
the provincial, federal and imperial governments all refused to make
concessions of any kind, and while the Quebec politician was mur-
dered the British diplomat was eventually released. The first kidnap-
ping was entirely and exclusively a Canadian matter, while the
second not only raised issues affecting the interests of Britain, a
country completely outside the Canada-Quebec separatist issue, but
also matters touching upon one of the most sacred and ancient of
international law6a principles, that concerning the safety and immun-
ity of diplomats.
International law is traditionally not concerned with matters
which only touch the interests and affairs of a single state. It becomes
a matter of international law when, directly or indirectly, the interests
of a third state are affected, either in its territory, its nationals or its
representatives. In the nineteenth century, even though acts of terror-
ism were by no means uncommon, they tended to be confined to the
territory of the government against which they were directed and
foreign states only became interested if the alleged terrorist sought
refuge within their territories. At that time, most acts of terrorism
6a. See, e.g. Green, "Trends in the Law Concerning Diplomats" (1981) 19 Canadian
Yearbook of International Law, 132 at 132-141.
242 The Dalhousie Law Journal
were directed against autocratic rulers and the practice grew among
European states of providing asylum to offenders guilty of 'political
offences'. Such offences were narrowly defined so as virtually to
exclude the intent of the offender and to look more to the purpose of
his act. A political offence was defined as one committed as part and
parcel of and during an organized attempt to overthrow a political
system. 7 Such a definition clearly reflects the liberal laisser faire
philosophy and represents an approach based upon the haves and the
have-nots of political power. As a result, the individual offender
committing some act of terrorism motivated by political hatred of the
victim of the system, but not directed to overthrowing the govern-
ment and replacing it by some other organized system, was not
recognized as being entitled to immunity from extradition because of
the political character of his offence. 7a This denial of immunity bore
heavily upon anarchists, who were regarded as the enemies of all
systems of government and so outside the definition as just
expounded.8 There was, however, one further exception. Most coun-
tries refused to regard as political offenders any terrorist whose act of
violence was directed against a head of state.
While there were some efforts to secure international co-operation
against anarchists and regicides on a limited scale,9 it was this type of
terrorist act that first found condemnation in what was intended to
be an international instrument of general application. After the
assassination of Alexander and Barthou, the League of Nations
directed itself to the need to declare such acts of terrorism a crime
under international law. In 1937 the League adopted a Convention
for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism10 which reaffirmed,
"the principle of international law in virtue of which it is the duty of
every State to refrain from any act designed to encourage terrorist
activities directed against another State and to prevent the acts in
which such activities take shape . . . . 'Acts of terrorism' means
criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to
create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of
persons or the general public."
7. Re Castioni [1891] 1 Q. B. 149; see also, Re Federenko (1910) 17 C.C.C. 268; Re
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Hernandez (1972) 30 D.L.R. (3d) 260,613; Re State
of Wisconsin and Armstrong (1972) 28 D.L.R. (3d) 513, 30 id. 527.
Ia. See also, Green,"Terrorism and 1he Cours" (19%1) 11 Manitoba Law Joumal, 333.
8. Re Meunier [1894] 2 Q.B. 415.
9. Eg., St. Petersburg Protocol 1904, (10 Martens, N.R.G. (3d Ser.) 81); South Ameri-
can Police Convention, 1920, (1 Hudson, International Legislation 448); Quito Agree-
ment re Mutual Defence against Undesirables (7 id. 166).
10. Id. 862.
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The Convention then went on to specify certain acts if committed
with this purpose, and required the parties to the treaty to make such
acts criminal if they were not already treated as such by the national
law. Chief of these was wilfully causing death or grievous bodily
harm or loss of liberty to heads of State or their designated or
hereditary successors, their spouses and persons charged with public
functions or holding public positions when the acts are directed
against them in their public capacity. It is doubtful whether this
definition would have covered the assassinations of Robert Kennedy,
Martin Luther King or Malcolm X, for none of these was holding a
public function with the act directed against him in that public
capacity. If President Kennedy or Reagan had been shot in a per-
sonal vendetta, as certainly seems to have been the case with the
latter, the same would be true. As to the attack on the Pope, there is
not yet sufficient evidence to be certain whether it would have fallen
within the League definition. The Convention also forbids wilful
destruction or damage to public property or any wilful act calculated
to endanger the lives of members of the public, together with the
manufacture or supplying of arms, explosives or other harmful
substances intended to be used for terrorist purposes in any country.
The Convention also called for the regulation of fire-arms, other than
smooth-bore sporting guns, and declared the alteration of passports
or the possession or use thereof to be punishable offences. It recog-
nized that national criminal codes would have to be amended and
sought to ensure that those accused of terrorism would not be
exempt from extradition. But even though all the members of the
League were willing to condemn terrorism in debate, the Convention
was signed by only 23 League members; and the only member of the
British Commonwealth to sign was the Empire of India, which was
the sole ratifying country. As a result, the treaty never came into
effect.I The League was aware of the need to supplement national
criminal jurisdiction, particularly as it might well be the case that an
alleged terrorist sought asylum in a friendly country or one which
found it embarrassing to prosecute him. Moreover, if international
law is to have any meaning in a field of this kind so that what is
described as an international crime may be measured by interna-
tional as distinct from national criminal law, an international crimi-
nal tribunal must be established. This was understood by the League
11. It is interesting to note that the Convention was drafted by a committee consisting of
Eden (U.K.) as rapporteur, Aloisi (Italy) and Laval (France) (Walters, A History of the
League of Nations, (1952), at 604-605). Of the three, only France signed.
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of Nations, but the Statute for such a Court, 2 drawn up at the same
time as the Terrorism Convention, only received thirteen signatures,
with none of them coming from the Commonwealth, and with none
of the signatories having ratified the Statute. To this day there is no
zini i ax CorA , so that o iftntts ikt pairay whikh -Ar iwInMaU-y dts-
cribed as crimes against international law have to be tried by national
criminal courts. This is equally true of war crimes, although after the
Second World War special tribunals made up of the representatives
of different countries were set up to try those who were described as
the major war criminals in Europe and the Far East, while the minor
war criminals were brought before military tribunals established by
their captors.
International law is only concerned with issues affecting the inter-
est of more than one country. In so far as terrorism is concerned this
means that the act in question must in one way or another be
transnatina.t in character. Put in another way, a tervarist from Qt
acting on behalf of country A or on behalf of some political group
would apply some form of violence or threat against the nationals,
territory agreement or property of country B, in order to secure some
concession from country A or C, or if the concession be sought from
B, then the pressure would be applied against the nationals, territory,
or property of country A or C. 13 In other words, an innocent third
party is involved in some way or another. Among the earliest forms
of terrorism of this kind to occur after the Second World War was the
use of letter bombs sent through the mails.In accordance with the
Universal Postal Convention 14 it is an offence to send explosives or
other inflammable substances through the mails, but the question of
punishment is left within the jurisdiction of member countries. There
is no suggestion, for example, that those responsible for any such
activity should be extradited to the country in which the explosion
takes place.
Letter bombs, however destructive they may be, tend to be res-
tricted in their scope of injury and are not as prone to arouse
international public interest as some of the other acts of violence with
which we have become familiar since 1945. If we look to the activities
of such groups as the Italian Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army,
12. 7 Hudson, op cit. 878.
13. See Green, 'The Nature and Control of International Terrorism' (1974) 4 Israel
Yearbook on Human Rights, 134 at 163-166.
14. 1964, U.S. T.I.A.S. 5881.
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the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Latin American urban guerrilla
groups, the South Moluccans in the Netherlands, or even the Irish
Republican Army or the Ulster Defence Association, 15 even though
their acts may arouse interest because of their scope, the personality
of the victim, or the horror of the particular outrage, it nevertheless
remains true that, for the most part, these acts are national in
character, that is to say directed against a national personality and
within the national territory. They only become important inter-
nationally if the offender escapes abroad when his extradition may be
requested, or if he commits an act against a co-national in a foreign
country when his act constitutes an offence against that country's
criminal law. To a great extent the world is only aware of the
occurrence of such 'local' acts because of the role played by the
media. 6 When the act crosses the frontier there is an automatic
arousal of interest which does not depend on news organs. Occasion-
ally, a terrorist act, particularly one committed by an urban guerrilla
group, is directed against an alien who is not an official of a foreign
government. It would seem that this should be automatically an issue
of international concern. However, care must be taken to assess
whether the victim is, in truth, an innocent third party completely
unconnected with the quarrel between the terrorist group and the
true objective of its terrorist act-usually the local government. This
problem has arisen frequently in Latin America when the victim of
terrorism has been a foreign businessman, often a United States
citizen, or a security adviser seconded by, for example, the Central
Intelligence Organization to assist in the training of local security
forces. In such circumstances, care must be taken to determine
whether the victim is so closely identified with the local authorities on
political, economic or security grounds, that this identification virtu-
ally makes him part of the establishment so that the terrorist act is, in
reality, national rather than international in character. This in fact
seems to have been the case of U.S. General Dozier kidnapped in
Italy as a protest against the latter's foreign policy.
The terrorist acts which have aroused most public interest have
been concerned with interference with international air traffic, by
way of the hijacking of aircraft. 7 In so far as interference with
15. An index of terrorist groups will be found in Dobson and Payne, The Terrorists,
(1979), 159-201.
16. See, e.g., Schmid and de Graff, Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media,
(1980), Miller, ed., Terrorism, The Media and the Law (1982).
17. See, e.g., Green, Piracy of Aircraft andthe Law, (1972), 10 Alberta L.R. 72; Joyner,
Hijacking as an International Crime, (1974), Mankiewicz, Le ddtournement des avions
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non-international flight is concerned, the situation differs from nor-
mal internal terrorism and may be regarded as an act affecting
international law, even though no interests of a third party are
directly involved. There are but few countries which are not involved
in international flight and all flights through uational airspace,
whether by internal or international carriers, have to be coordinated.
If an aircraft is diverted during flight all other air traffic in the region
is interfered with and may have to be terminated or deviated. If the
diverted aircraft is about to make an unscheduled landing, all other
aircraft using the airport involved are themselves affected. If rescue
or interception aircraft are sent after the diverted plane, international
traffic is even more seriously interfered with. If the diverted aircraft
lands and those responsible for its hijacking threaten the security of
the passengers or threaten to destroy the aircraft on the ground, the
security of the airport and thus of all air traffic using that airport is
equally endangered. However, the most 'glamorous' forms of aeriat
hijacking have been interferences with international air traffic with a
terrorist group seizing, or otherwise endangering an aircraft belong-
ing to one country, carrying nationals of a number of countries and
making use of the landing facilities of yet another country. For the
most part, these acts of terrorism have been carried out by various
Palestinian groups associated with the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation in connection with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. On occa-
sion, the purpose has been to secure publicity. On others, the aim has
been to apply pressure to Israel to secure the release of other terror-
ists, either by applying threats against Israeli subjects or by seeking to
bring pressure to bear from other states whose nationals may be
endangered by the hijack.
Although international transportation of every kind is a matter of
interest to all countries, the United Nations has not shown itself
over-enthusiastic in dealing with the control or prevention of aerial
hijacking. While that organization has been willing to issue a number
of 'motherhood' resolutions paying lip-service to the condemnation
of terrorism,18 any attempt to put teeth or real meaning into such
measures has been frustrated by political consideration. The United
Nations, despite efforts by idealists, the media, and world-govern-
ment-mongers, is not an entity with a life of its own. It is not and was
never intended to be a parliament or lawmaking body for the world.
It is nothing but a permanent diplomatic conference made up of the
(1971), Rev.Fr. de Droit Adrien No. 4, 1; McWhinney, ed., Aerial Piracy andInternational
Law (1971); McWhinney, The Illegal Diversion ofAircraft and International Law (1975).
18. E.g., Res. 3034 (XXVII): 31/103; 32/147; 34/145, adopted between 1972 and 1980.
International Law and the Control of Terrorism 247
representatives of states sent there by the political bodies that consti-
tute the governments of the members, who reach political decisions
on political issues in accordance with the political desires of their
political masters.' 9 As a result, the various attempts that have been
made to secure effective action against terrorism have floundered on
the fact that some of the members of the United Nations sympathise
with such terrorist organizations as those affiliated to the Palestine
Liberation Organization, while others like Libya2 have not hesitated
to finance all sorts of terrorist movements for its own political
purposes, and still others have proved willing to offer hospitality to
terrorists coming from particular areas, as occurred in the early years
of aerial hijacking in the case of Cuban and American aerial terror-
ists.21 In so far as the occasions for raising terrorism issues in the
United Nations have related to the Middle East situation between
Israel, the Arab states and the Palestinians, the attitude of the Arab
states and the Third World generally has been to argue that it is more
important to deal with the causes of terrorism than a particular act of
terrorism. On the surface, this is of course an attractive argument. If
one can eradicte the cause, then the consequence will not occur.
However, this overlooks the fact that the Middle East situation,
alleged to be the cause of such acts of terrorism, has been with us for
some thirty years and it is hardly realistic to argue that terrorism
affecting that area or the countries involved should not be considered
until the basic political problem has been solved.
It is because of this difficulty that aerial hijacking has been dealt
with through the medium of the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation, even though not all countries are members and though, more
recently, the Organization has taken what many may regard as a
self-destructive step by giving consultative status to the Palestine
Liberation Organization which has been responsible for so many of
the hijackings. It is hardly realistic to plan steps against this menace in
the presence of those responsible for it. As a result of the Tokyo,
Hague and Montreal Conventions (1963, 1970 and 1971)22, the
parties to those agreements have undertaken to make offences
against aircraft, including deviation or hijacking, criminal offences
19. See comments in advisory opinion on Reparationfor Injuries Suffered in Service of
the United Nations (Bernadotte) [1949] I.C.J. 174, 178-179.
20. See, e.g., Sterling, The Terror Network, (1981), ch. 14.
21. Eventually controlled by Exchange of Notes on Hijacking of Aricraft and Vessels
and Other Offenses between U.S. and Cuba, 12 I.L.M. 370; see also, similar Agreement
between Canada and Cuba, Can.T.S. 1973/11.
22. 2 .L.M. 1042; lOid. 133, 1151.
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triable by those countries affected by the hijacking or countries in
which a hijacker is found. Such offences are not to be treated as
political offences, but if the holding country decides not to proceed
against the offender, an application for extradition by the demanding
country is to be governed by the local law relating to extradition, thus
opening the possibility for the courts hearing the application to
decide that the offender is covered by this exception regardless of this
provision. As is normal with treaties condemning particular acts as
contrary to international law, there is no provision for the creation of
a special tribunal. So once again we find that some countries, though
parties to the Convention, as, for example Uganda at the time of the
Entebbe incident, fail to take the measures called for. Because of the
continuance of aerial offences despite the three Conventions, a group
of States - Canada, the Federal German Republic, France, Italy,
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States - entered the Bonn
Agreement undertaking to cut off aenalontac wth counties giA'ng
asylum to aerial terrorists, or failing to proceed against or to extradite
them when requested. 23 This Agreement might have some meaning if
the countries concerned carried out such an undertaking. However,
where some are concerned, such action might be construed as con-
trary to the freedom of trade and of contract and as such unconstitu-
tional, while others do not fly to countries of asylum, e.g., Algiers,
Libya, Yemen and Saudi Arabia, at any time.
It is because of the ineffectiveness of the ICAO agreements that
individual countries have had to decide how to confront aerial
terrorism directed against them or their nationals. In the case of the
German rescue of passengers in the Lufthansa aircraft diverted to
Mogadishu by its hijackers - 4 Palestinian terrorists - in 197724 and of
the Indonesian rescue of passengers on a diverted Garuda plane at
Bangkok in 1981,25 no problems arise since these particular rescue
efforts received the consent if not the active support of the authorities
of the country to which the aircraft had been diverted. The situation
was somewhat different with the Air France aircraft hijacked by a
multinational group of terrorists to Entebbe, Uganda, in 1976. For
the release of its passengers, freedom for a variety of detained terror-
ists was demanded. Regardless of any international obligation relat-
23. 1978, 17 id., 1073. In their 1981 affirmation of the Agreement they announced their
intention to suspend flights to Afghanistan consequent upon the latter's treatment of the
hijackers of a Pakistan International Airlines aircraft, 20 id. 956, though very few of them
flew there anyway.
24. Geraghty, Inside the SAS, (1980), at 170-173.
25. The imes (London), 1 Apr. 1981.
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ing to the safety of aliens,26 the Ugandan authorities offered comfort
to the terrorists and even assisted them in holding their prisoners.
When it became clear that the terrorists were discriminating against
the Israeli and Jewish passengers in their custody and threatening to
murder them, and that the Ugandan authorities were not prepared to
do anything to frustrate this exercise, the Israelis mounted a success-
ful rescue operation in the course of which some Ugandan military
personnel were killed and Ugandan aircraft destroyed. Far from
condemning the terrorist act or the Ugandan complicity, an effort
was made to secure United Nations condemnation of the Israeli
operation as an act of aggression against Uganda, threatening its
independence and international peace and security.27 International
law has always recognized the right of a state, when absolutely
necessary, to take steps to preserve the lives of its nationals abroad.
Moreover, aggression occurs when the security of the state against
which action has been taken is threatened for the ulterior political
motives of the state taking such action, and the Charter of the United
Nations only forbids actions which are directed against the political
independence or territorial integrity of the victim state.28 In the
Entebbe incident, the purpose of the Israeli raid was narrowly limited
to the specific purpose of the rescue of the hostages. There was no
intention on the part of Israel to occupy Uganda or undertake
military operations against that country with a view to achieving its
defeat or Israeli political ends, nor was there any intent to occupy the
country, alter its territorial integrity or threaten its political inde-
pendence. In fact, the operation was of short duration and termi-
nated once the passengers were liberated. The U gandan injuries were
part and parcel of action necessary to the successful achievement of
this limited purpose, for the military sought to frustrate the rescue,
while the aircraft were destroyed in order to prevent pursuit. Far
from being contrary to international law, the Israeli operation was in
accordance with well-established principles of humanitarian inter-
vention and self-help, and in no way contrary to the principles
established in the Charter of the United Nations. 29 When the interna-
tional community fails to uphold the rule of law it may well be that
26. LUih and FRaxmai, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens occasioned by
Terrorist Activities, (1977), 26 American Univ. L.R. 217.
27. The text of the proposed Resolutions and extracts from the Security Council debate
will be found in 15 I.L.M. 1226-1234.
28. Art. 2(4).
29. See, e.g., Green, Humanitarian Intervention - 1976 Version, (1976), 24 Chitty's L.J.
217; Rescue at Entebbe - Legal Aspects (1976), 6 Israel Y.B. Human Rights 312.
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this task falls upon the state, the invasion of whose rights amounts to
a breach of the rule of law and all accepted principles of international
morality and behaviour.
One of the favourite activities of urban guerrillas, whether in LatinA.M-nea joy Exxr opt, h-4S btt tD a+t-tk %olg 0Mb%,S-.S'0 im w t k
foreign diplomatic personnel.3' And this tactic has also been used by
some of the Palestinian groups as well as by groups directing their
anti-government activities through the medium of ambassadors,
whether resident in the country of the terrorist group or abroad.
Since diplomatic immunity and the protection of diplomats are
among the oldest principles of international law, certainly reaching
back into ancient Greece,32 and since all countries are likely to be
affected by such conduct, the political ideology which has been
responsible for the attack tends to be ignored and states are inclined
to regard an attack against one diplomat as being directed against the
entire diplotnatiC corps&3 It has therefore proved easier to secure
United Nations action against such acts than it has been in regard to
other terrorist activities. However, despite the general interest in
upholding international law at least in those matters that affect every
one of them, some members of the United Nations have proved
determined to preserve their political ideology in support of such
terrorist movements as might be described as operating in the name
of national liberation and self-determination. The decision as to the
identification of such movements is subjective and it is accepted in
United Nations practice that a national liberation movement is one
that is recognized as such by the regional organization in the area in
which the movement is conducting its activities. This means, of
course, that where there is no such organization or where the author-
ity against which the movement is operating has the support of the
majority of the members of the organization, the likelihood of
recognizing the movement as one of national liberation is somewhat
remote. It is unlikely, therefore, that the Irish Republican Army or
the Front de Libdration du Qudbec will receive such recognition. In
fact, at the present time only the Palestine Liberation Organization,
the South West Africa People's Organization and the [South] Afri-
30. 48 embassies were taken over between 1971 and 1980, Jenkins, Embassies under
Siege, 1981. There have been further 'instances since.
31. See Baumann, The Diplomatic Kidnappings, (1973).
32. See Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome,
(1911), vol. 1, at 328-337.
33. See reaction to arrest of Russian ambassador in London, 1708, 1 Blackstone,
Commentaries, (10th ed., 1787, at 255.
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can National Congress enjoy this status. These latter organizations
are supported by the Third World and also by the members of the
Communist bloc who can thus control an automatic majority in the
United Nations. As a result, when the General Assembly adopted the
Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Inter-
nationally Protected Person, including Diplomatic Agents in Decem-
ber 1973,34 it was very conscious of its Resolution on Measures to
Prevent International Terrorism, 35 adopted a year earlier. While this
Resolution condemned acts of international terrorism "which are
occurring with increasing frequency and which take a toll of innocent
lives," and recognized the need for international co-operation to
prevent their occurrence and to study "their underlying causes with a
view to finding just and peaceful solutions as quickly as possible," it
nevertheless reaffirmed "the inalienable right to self-determination
and independence of all people under colonial and racist regimes
[which by reason of a Resolution of 197536 include Zionism and thus
Israel as a 'Zionist State'] and other forms of alien domination and
upholds the legitimacy of their struggle, in particular the struggle of
national liberation movements... [and] condemn[ed] the continua-
tion of repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, racist and alien
regimes in denying peoples their legitimate right to self-determination
and independence and other human rights and fundamental free-
doms." These sentiments are not expressed in the 1973 Convention in
any way, but the Convention is part of a General Assembly Resolu-
tion 37 which specifically states "that the provisions of the annexed
Convention could not in any way prejudice the exercise of the
legitimate right to self-determination and independance ...by
peoples struggling against colonialism, alien domination, foreign
occupation, racial discrimination [including Zionism] and apartheid
...The present resolution, whose provisions are related to the
annexed Convention, shall always be published together with it."
It should be noticed that the type of struggle reserved from the
application of the Convention is wider than that waged by a national
liberation movement, and opens the door to any act of terrorism
against an internationally protected person by any movement claim-
ing to be engaged in a struggle for self-determination "against colon-
ialism, alien domination [or] foreign occupation." Although this was
not officially put forward on behalf of the Iranians who seized the
34. 13 I.L.M. 41.
35. Res. 3034 (XXVII).
36. Res. 3379 (XXX).
37. Res. 3166 (XXVIII).
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United States Embassy in Tehran in 1979, it did form part of their
propaganda campaign. In fact, Iran was a party to this Convention,
and had even signed the Protocol accepting the jurisdiction of the
World Court in relation to disputes connected therewith. The seizure
of the Embassy and *hthe vonstqutent a+tti+twde of tht hanian G tmn-
ment,38 accompanied by its refusal to abide by the decisions of the
Security Council or of the World Court, shows how artificial it is to
pin any hope upon agreements of this kind or upon action through
the United Nations in dealing with terrorism, particularly if the act
involved can be expressed as part of an ideological struggle against a
western power. The failure of the Iranian government to abide by its
obligations or to observe any international decision in this case
justifies the ultimate decision by the United States to attempt to effect
an Entebbe-like rescue, regardless of the fact that the Court, in what
everybody knew would be an unobserved decision, called upon the
parties to do nothiftg to aggravate the situ vn 9
The only other major issue in relation to terrorism with which the
United Nations has purported to deal relates to the taking of hos-
tages, an action which is even forbidden in time of armed conflict.
40
In 1979 the General Assembly adopted without vote an International
Convention against the Taking of Hostages,41 declaring that "any
person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure or to
continue to detain another person (hereinafter referred to as the
'hostage') in order to compel a third party, namely, a State, an
international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical
person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as
an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostage com-
mits the offence of taking of hostages ('hostage-taking') within the
meaning of the Convention." The Convention does not apply "where
the offence is committed within a single State, the hostage and the
alleged offender are nationals of that State and the alleged offender is
found in the territory of that State," so it would not apply if, for
example, a member of the Irish Republican Army or the Ulster
Defence Association took British nationals hostage within the Uni-
ted Kingdom. By including national and juridical and groups of
38. See, e.g., Green, The Tehran Embassy Incident- LegalAspects, (1980), 19Archiv des
V1lkerrechts 1980, 1; Case concerning U.S. Diplomats and Consular Staff in Tehran
119791 I.C.3. 7 (Interim Measures), .19D) I.C.. 3 (Merits).
39. In its decision on the merits, the Court criticized the U.S. on this ground, 31, 33,43.
40. See Protocol I, 1977, additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949 (16
I.L.M. 1391), Art. 75 (2)(c).
41. 18 I.L.M. 1457; see also, Crelington and Szabo, Hostage- Taking, (1979). By 31 Dec.
1981, only 16 states had become parties to the Convention.
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persons, the Convention is, however, wide enough to apply to any act
of private kidnapping in which the release of the victim depends on
any form of ransom, provided more than one state is concerned, as,
for example, by reason of the offender transporting his victim across
a frontier.
Although the Preamble to the Convention "reaffirm[s] the princi-
ple of equal rights and self-determination," there is no reservation
respecting hostage-takings allegedly effected in connection with a
struggle for self-determination. On the other hand, any request for
the extradition of a hostage-taker will be denied "if the requested
State Party has substantial grounds for believing that the request for
extradition... has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or
punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality,
ethnic origin or political opinion." Since there is no measuring rod to
determine what constitutes 'substantial grounds', the success of the
Convention rests solely on the good faith of the requested State in
exercising its discretion, and if the offender has left the country of his
act it may be presumed that he has sought refuge in a country
sympathetic to him and so unlikely to acquiesce in an extradition
request. True, the Convention makes provision for arbitration of
disputes, but any state signing or ratifying the Convention may
exclude the operation of this provision. In the absence of any interna-
tional criminal court, therefore, the only teeth available as a result of
this Convention is local criminal law.
In what appears to be an attempt to prevent any rescue attempt, it
is expressly provided that "nothing in this Convention shall be
construed as justifying the violation of the territorial integrity or
political independence of a State in contravention of the Charter of
the United Nations." This provision, however, may be regarded as
merely a verbal affirmation of existing law, for if a rescue attempt
were restricted, as were Entebbe and the abortive United States
exercise in Iran, to the rescue of the hostages, with no threat to the
political independence or territorial integrity of the country affected,
and if the exercise lasted only so long as was necessary to effect the
rescue, then it would not constitute a breach of the Convention, any
more than the Israeli and United States operations were contrary to
general international law or the Charter of the United Nations.
As recently as 1980, the General Assembly passed yet another
Resolution
"unequivocally condemn[ing] all acts of international terrorism
which endanger or take human lives or jeopardize fundamental
freedoms; the continuation of repressive and terrorist acts by colon-
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ial, racist and alien regimes in denying people their legitimate right to
self-determination and independence and other human rights and
fundamental freedoms;... urg[ing] all States, unilaterally and in
cooperation with other States, as well as relevant United Nations
organs, to contribute to the progressive elimination of the causes
underlying international terrorism; call[ing] upon all States to fulfil
their obligations under international law, to refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist
acts in another State, or acquiescing in organized activities within
their territory directed towards the commission of such acts;...
invit[ing] all States to take all appropriate measures at the national
level with a view to the speedy and final elimination of the problem of
international terrorism ...; ...recogniz[ing] that, in order to
contribute to the elimination of the causes and the problem of
international terrorism, both the General Assembly and the Security
Council should pay special attention to all situations, including, inter
alia, colonialism, racism and situations involving alien occupation,
that may give rise to international terrorism and may endanger
international peace and security, with a view to the application where
feasible and necessary, of the relevant provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations, including Chapter VII thereof,"42
concerning the application of enforcement measures. This Resolu-
tion was carried by 118 to nil, with 22 abstentions.
So long as the United Nations raises the issues of self-determination
and national liberation to the level of its 'tablets of stone' and pays
more attention to causes of, than the acts of terrorism, there is little
real value that can come from the documents likely to emanate from
that Organization. In fact, the concern with national liberation has
reached such levels that even aggressive acts carried out in its name
are expressly excluded by Article 7 from the Definition of Aggression
adopted in 1974.43 It is clear, therefore, that, so long as political
rivalries and ideologies remain as they are, any effective action
against terrorism on the international level will come from bilateral
arrangements or agreements among the members of regional group-
ings. Of these, the most important is the Council of Europe's Conven-
tion on the Suppression of Terrorism which came into force in
1977. 44 Despite the common political outlook of the parties, both
Ireland and Malta refused to sign this Convention, while some of
those accepting it did so only with reservations, primarily with
respect to any offence condemned by the Convention as terrorism
42. Res. 34/145.
43. Res. 3314 (XXIX).
44. 15 I.L.M. 1272.
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"which it considers to be a political offence, an offence connected
with a political offence or an offence inspired by political motives."
Such reservations have been made by Italy, Norway and Portugal,45
and in 1979 the European Communities expressly recognized 46 the
right to make such a reservation precluding the extradition of offend-
ers, thus giving sanction to the parties to exclude any terrorist act that
they please, although they are under an obligation to submit every
such case without exception to local prosecution. In the case of
France, the reservation has been expressed differently in view of the
fact that, by its Constitution, "Anyone persecuted on account of his
action for the cause of liberty has the right to asylum on the territory
of the Republic."
Clearly the entire value of the Convention rests on the good faith
of its parties, and this, as shown by the Irish non-acceptance, is
affected by its own political sympathies. Since, unlike the other
conventions relating to terrorism, the European Convention is
directed against terrorism as such, it is worth noting how it defines
terrorism: "For the purpose of extradition between Contracting
States, none of the following offences shall be regarded as a political
offence or as an offence connected with a political offence or as an
offence inspired by political motives," acts falling within the Hague
and Montreal Conventions on Hijacking or the Convention on
Internationally Protected Persons, "an offence involving kidnap-
ping, the taking of a hostage or serious unlawful detention [or] an
offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic
firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons."
Apparently, therefore, the use of a non-automatic firearm to the
same end would not constitute terrorism under the Convention. It
might well be argued that this differentiation is not really significant
in view of the reservations that have been made and are permitted to
be made, which would appear to go to the very root of the Conven-
tion and be, as such, contrary to the whole tenor thereof. 47
If terrorism is to be dealt with on an international level,48 it would
seem that all attempts to secure universal agreement must be aban-
doned, other than as expressions of a moral conviction that'mother-
hood' is a good thing. On the regional level, an agreement can only be
45. 16 id., 1329.
46. 19 id., 325.
47. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (8 ibid. 679), Art. 19(c), which
seeks to forbid reservations "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty."
48. For a fuller discussion of International Crimes and the Legal Process, see Green,
(1980) 29 Int'l & Comp. L.Q., 566.
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effective among states which have a common outlook as to the rule of
law and the need to prevent and suppress terrorist acts whenever they
occur. This means that there is no room for exceptions like that
provided in the name of national liberation or political motivation.
'The act must be condemned and dealt with by whoever commits it
and for whatever purpose. Sympathy with the actor may result in
mitigation of punishment, but it must not be allowed to create
exemption from responsibility. It must be recognized, however, that
agreements of whatever kind are not likely to prevent terrorism. At
most they can prescribe the treatment to be accorded after the
terrorist act has taken place. Prevention, perhaps, depends upon the
willingness of a group of states to act in unison swiftly and severely
against acts of terrorism, whatever their motivation, when they occur
in territories under their control, in order to demonstrate to terrorists
that their act will no longer achieve its purpose, whether this be
ptbficibty or a concession. 3slt as the N AT'O P owei ha-e crtated a
joint command and the United Nations its Emergency Forces, so
those who wish to suppress and punish terrorism must be prepared to
create a joint international force able to act effectively and imme-
diately and, if necessary, ruthlessly whenever terrorism occurs. If this
means that innocent lives, including those of hostages, may be lost, so
be it. Many of the terrorist groups have proclaimed that they are at
war with the existing political and social way of life of individual
states49 and of western democracy itself.50 In war, lives are lost and
democratic rights restricted. If the principle and the rule of law are to
be upheld, and if the world is to be made less prone to terrorism in the
futtte, losses may hav.e te be amcepted at the present tinte.
49. See The Times (London), 13 Jun. 1980, re Libyan support for the I.R.A.; see also,
statement by I.R.A. in Red Brigades publication, Controlnforrfazione, Nov. 1978, cf.
Sterling, supra, note 20 at 151.
50. See Demaris, Brothers in Blood (1977), at 184; see also, communiqu6 by the Struggle
Against World Imperialism Organization, cited by Heren in 'Terrorism: Myth and
Reality', The Times (London), 22 Oct. 1977.
